Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 29
Issue 3 May 1996

Article 4

1996

Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters
the 21st Century
Frederick M. Abbott

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the 21st Century,
29 Vanderbilt Law Review 471 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol29/iss3/4

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Commentary: The International

Intellectual Property Order Enters the
21st Century
FrederickM. Abbott*
ABSTRACT

This Commentary followed presentation of the first two
articles in this volume at a meeting on the TRIPS Agreement
The commentator first reflects on the theme of Professor
Oddi's article, and suggests that the TRIPS Agreement must
be evaluated in the broad context of the Uruguay Round
bargain. He observes that the potential economic impact of
the TRIPS Agreement on global economic development is of
central concern, and that much work remains to be done both
in refining economic analysis of the Agreement, and in
addressing developmental issues. The commentator then
discusses renewed interest in the activities of WIPO, and he
highlights various sets of issues raised by the TRIPS
Agreement.
These Include issues relating to dispute
settlement, implementation, nullification and impairment, and
exhaustion/parallelimportation.

*

Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-

Kent College

of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.

This Commentary

constitutes the text of remarks delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American
Association of Law Schools, Intellectual Property Law Section Meeting, San
Antonio, Texas, January 4. 1996, with minor author's revisions (including the
furnished citations).
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I. REMARKS ON THE PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR ODDI

My comments begin with a few remarks concerning the
issues raised by Professor Oddi.'
From the outset of the Uruguay Round negotiations there
was some degree of skepticism among trade specialists
Two central
concerning the goals of the TRIPS Agreement. 2
questions were whether the TRIPS Agreement might harm the
economic interests of developing countries, and how the
Agreement might take into account the potentially disparate
The
interests of industrialized and developing countries.
developing countries ultimately accepted the TRIPS Agreement as
part of a bargained-for-exchange, not because they concluded
that the Agreement as a stand-alone matter was necessarily in
their best interests. Now, what was the bargain?
In positive terms, the bargain included concessions on
agricultural export subsidies by the European Union (EU),
increased market access for tropical products, and special
attention to developing country interests in a number of the
Uruguay Round agreements (e.g., in terms of transition
arrangements). In somewhat more negative terms, it included
express and implied promises by the United States to refrain from
using unilateral measures against the developing countries in the
intellectual property rights (IPRs) arena, provided that minimum

1.

A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-NaturalRights and a "Polite Form of Economic

Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
2.
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 6-19,

365-403 (GATT Secretariat ed.. 1994).
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TRIPS conditions were met. Finally, there was the implicit threat
that, without the TRIPS Agreement, the Uruguay Round would

fail, and that might have had serious adverse

economic

consequences for developing countries. In talking with developing
country negotiators in the field of agriculture, for example, one
may find that they are not entirely satisfied with the agricultural
concessions that were ultimately made-the EU concessions did
not reach the level they had hoped for, and the United States did
not press the EU as hard as it might have, so there may be some
dissatisfaction with the terms of the bargain. Nevertheless, the
TRIPS Agreement must be viewed in this broad context, and not
as an isolated event.
It is also fairly well recognized that there was limited
empirical data on which to base an economic analysis of the
potential implications of the TRIPS Agreement. Trade specialists
were uncertain during the Uruguay Round, and are uncertain
now, as to what the economic effects of the TRIPS Agreement will
be.
Efforts of the U.S. government and industry were
concentrated on demonstrating high levels of IPRs-related losses
for U.S. enterprises. Studies such as the International Trade
Commission report concluding that U.S. industries lost in the
order of $43 to $61 billion in 1986 from IPRs misappropriations
were not designed as scientific exercises, and they were not in any
event intended to evaluate the potential impact of the TRIPS
Agreement on global economic development. 3 There has been an
increasing attention to serious economic evaluation of the role of
intellectual property in the international arena over the past four
or five years. 4 Carlos Braga at the World Bank, for example, is
5
doing very good work in this area.
The U.N. Transnational Corporations and Management
Division has produced an intriguing study on whether or not

3.
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE app. H-3 (1988).
4.

See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Trade-RelatedIntellectual PropertyRights, 52

EUR.ECON. 157 (1993).

5.
See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues:
The Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implications (Jan. 26-27, 1995)
(unpublished paper presented to the World Bank Conference at the Uruguay
Round and the Developing Economies, Washington, D.C.); Carlos A. Primo Braga
and Carsten Fink, The Economic Justificationfor the Grant of Intellectual Property
Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL
TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds.,
forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY].
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protection of IPRs encourages foreign direct investment (FDI).6

This study concludes that there is little empirical evidence of a
correlation between high levels of IPRs protection and high levels
The countries with the weakest levels of IPRs
of FDI.
protection-the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Brazil,
Argentina, Thailand, etc.--over the past decade have routinely
been the recipients of the largest net FDI inflows. There has been
a significant correlation between the United States Trade
Representative's (USTR) list of worst IPRs violators and the
highest levels of U.S. foreign direct investment.
One should not overestimate the extent to which the TRIPS
Agreement will have an immediate, dramatic effect on developing
country practices.
There are substantial transition periods.
There may well be passive resistance on the part of developing
Some World Trade
countries to implementing changes.
Organization (WTO) Members may implement regimes with
respect to the imposition of IPRs-specific fees and taxes. 7 The
United States, EU, and Japan may find that implementation and
compliance do not go as smoothly as they hope. There is still a
developing country majority in the WTO, and there remains some
resistance to the TRIPS program.
One of the most interesting developments over the past year
is a renewed interest in the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). Currently, there is under negotiation in
WIPO a Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes Between States in
the Field of Intellectual Property (WIPO Dispute Settlement
Treaty).8 It is a fascinating exercise intended to provide an
alternative forum for the settlement of intellectual property
disputes. The surprising thing about it is that OECD countries,
other than the United States, have been very much behind the
negotiation of this new treaty. The EU has tendered detailed
proposals.
Some of the most serious issues at the moment
concern the prospective relationship between WIPO dispute
settlement and WTO dispute settlement; whether or not the

6.
U.N. TRANSNAT'L CORP. & MGMT. Div., U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.N.

Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/24, U.N. Sales No. E.93.1I.A. 10 (1993).
7.
The author has discussed the legality of such measures under the
TRIPS Agreement in Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Development, In PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5.
8.
For background information, see Draft Treaty on the Settlement of
Disputes Between States In the Field of Intellectual Property, Int'l Bureau of WIPO.
Comm. of Experts on the Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes Between
States, 5th Sess., May 10-21, paras. 1-2, at 1, WIPO Doc. SD/CE/V/2 (Apr. 8,
1993). More recently, see INT'L BUREAU OF WIPO. COMM. OF EXPERTS ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES, 7th Sess., May

29-June 2, 1995, WIPO Doc. SD/CE/VII/8 (June 2, 1995).
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initiation of proceedings in one forum will suspend initiation of
proceedings in another, and so forth. 9 The WIPO Dispute
Settlement Treaty has considerable merit on substantive grounds.
It is nevertheless interesting to consider the basis for the renewed
interest in WIPO, since a major objective of the TRIPS Agreement
was to move the center of IPRs gravity from WIPO to the WTO,
where Members would have recourse to trade-based enforcement
of IPRs.
There may be a number of reasons for the heightened level of
interest in WIPO. One reason might be that developing countries
are trying to redress the shift in the IPRs balance of power that
the TRIPS Agreement represents. Perhaps, officials at national
IPRs offices in the industrialized countries, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), the European Patent Office, etc., felt a bit
excluded from the TRIPS Agreement process when the trade
specialists suddenly had taken over the IPRs field. Now the IPRs
specialists are beginning to reemerge, or at least wanting to
reemerge, as the major players in the IPRs field. They may be
attempting to move the center of gravity back across Geneva, from
the WTO to WIPO.
There certainly is a recognition that the WIPO Secretariat,
and WIPO Committees of Experts, are highly expert in the IPRs
field, and that this expertise is of great value to the international
community.
There are a myriad of complex IPRs-related
substantive issues to be addressed in multilateral legal
instruments, and WIPO may be the best forum for IPRs-related
negotiations.
The WIPO Secretariat's role in administering
multilateral conventions such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty
has become increasingly important, and the WIPO Secretariat will
continue to provide valuable technical expertise to developing
countries. For all of these reasons, the renewed interest in WIPO

is not so difficult to fathom.
I am sympathetic to some of Professor Oddi's concerns with
respect to the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, but I am not so
skeptical as he, because I believe that there will be some positive
economic value to the agreement for the developing countries,
taken in its context.

9.
For more detailed discussion, see Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute
Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, In INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT-WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., forthcoming 1996).
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II. BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT

A. Dispute Settlement
There are a myriad of fascinating issues raised by the TRIPS
Agreement in relation to dispute settlement: how past state
practice in respect to WIPO-administered conventions will be
taken into account in interpreting the Agreement; how national
and regional court decisions will be treated; and so forth.' 0
The TRIPS Agreement requires all WTO Members to
adequately enforce IPRs rules, and yet there is little in the TRIPS
Agreement to specifically guide dispute settlement panels as to
what it means, literally, to provide adequate enforcement. 1 The
question is open whether a Member's claim may succeed based on
a single failure to protect IPRs, or whether the failure must be
systemic. Furthermore, if a Member must show a systemic
failure, it remains to be determined what elements would go into
demonstrating such a failure.
With respect to whether a
Member's intellectual property laws comply with TRIPS Agreement
minimum standards, there is question as to what presumptions
might be created by the adoption of a model law or the adoption of
a law prepared in consultation with WIPO. What presumptions
might be created if a Member's intellectual property laws have
been favorably reviewed by the TRIPS Council? These are but a
few of the many interesting questions relating to dispute
settlement.
B. DevelopmentalIssues
Regarding economic development, it is generally understood
that there will be a near term rent transfer from South to North
based on implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Commercially
valuable IPRs that are preponderantly owned by industrialized
country enterprises have become more secure, and returns based
on these more secure IPRs will increase over the near term. The
OECD countries, of course, have argued that this pattern will be
self-correcting over time: that technology will be more freely
licensed; that developing countries will create more intellectual
property and produce more IPRs-related goods and services; that
developing countries will benefit; and, therefore, that the situation

10.

See id. (discussing these issues in detail).

11.

Id.
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Will correct itself. Professor Oddi 1 2 is obviously skeptical about

the self-correcting features, and has suggested a number of ways
that developing countries may go about changing the situation in
their favor. This is probably the central set of issues raised by the
TRIPS Agreement.13

C. Implementation Questions
There are also implementation questions, technical and
otherwise. Dr. Wager discussed the "mailbox rule."14 Will it be
adequately implemented? Will the EU challenge the United States
with a number of the TRIPS-related complaints that it has been
threatening? Will the WTO turn into a North-North TRIPS dispute
settlement forum? The United States amended its Section 301
legislation to say that even if other countries are complying with
the TRIPS Agreement, it may still impose trade sanctions on them
15
for failing to reasonably protect intellectual property rights.
This is a very unusual thing for the United States to have done.
Presumably, it was done in order to say, "Well, the TRIPS
Agreement does not cover everything, so we can still bring claims
against you for things the TRIPS Agreement has not yet covered."
But, this is still a bit of an inflammatory action in the context of
the Uruguay Round bargain.
D. Nonviolation Nullification and Impairment and MarketAccess
Rights

There are two truly open questions with respect to the TRIPS
Agreement. First, there is the nonviolation nullification and
impairment issue. For non-trade specialists this is very obscure
terminology. It basically means that, in the WTO system, a
Member can bring a claim against another Member even though
the complained-against Member is complying with the Agreement,
on the grounds that the complained-against action somehow
deprives the complaining Member of benefits it expected to get
when it entered into the Agreement.
There is considerable uncertainty as to whether market
access rights in the field of IPRs are covered by the TRIPS
Agreement. Toward the end of the Uruguay Round, a decision

12.
13.
14.

Oddi, supra note 1.
The author's views are elaborated in Abbott, supra note 7.
See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS:

Emerging World View. 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (1996).
19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(II) (1994).
15.

The
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was made by the EU and the United States that negotiations

concerning market access in the audio-visual field (e.g., involving
U.S. complaints against EU restrictions on film and television
broadcasts) would take place in the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) negotiating forum. If it is determined that
market access rights are not covered by the TRIPS Agreement, the
United States might nevertheless wish to complain that the rights
of its nationals under the TRIPS Agreement are being nullified or
impaired by EU market access restrictions. Such a complaint
cannot presently be brought under the terms of the TRIPS
Agreement, but this limitation may expire after five years. 16
Professor Cornish has observed that intellectual property
rights are basically negative rights. 17 They generally permit IPRs
holders to restrict activities in which others might engage.
Historically, IPRs have not been positive rights. They have not
granted market access. Governments exert considerable control
over what can be done with speech, books, audio-visual products,
etc. Governments may be reluctant to permit TRIPS to be used as
a market access mechanism because of concern over cultural
controls, national policy controls, security controls, and so on.
E. The Open Question of Exhaustion
The most interesting open question for trade specialists may
be the exhaustion question. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement
says that the Agreement says nothing about exhaustion. The
TRIPS Agreement will be subject to a major review in five years.
Perhaps the issue of exhaustion will be addressed at that time.
The ILA International Trade Law Committee has agreed to

focus on the exhaustion/parallel imports question as a central
research topic, and to attempt to formulate a proposal regarding
it. 18 Regarding this question, one point might be made here.
IPRs
specialists,
with
good
reason,
come
to
the
exhaustion/parallel imports question from the standpoint of the
territoriality of IPRs. That is a reasonable starting place; it is the
way the IPRs system developed. Trade specialists tend to come at

16.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 64(2) & (3).
17.
Remarks of Bill Cornish at the WIPO Headquarters meeting of the
International Trade Law Committee of the International Law Association (June
1995).
18.
Professor Abbott is the Co-Rapporteur for this committee, with
responsibility for TRIPS subject matter. There is a substantial literature on the
exhaustion/parallel imports question, and considerable case law in many
jurisdictions. Several papers on this subject have already been prepared for the
Committee. The brief remarks in this text do not begin to address this complex
question, and are not so Intended. They are made only by way of calling attention
to work being carried out In another forum.
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the exhaustion/parallel
imports
question
from another
perspective: that rules blocking the importation of products are
nontariff barriers to trade, and that nontariff barriers are
fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of the WTO, all
other things being equal. The question for trade specialists is
whether these nontariff barriers can be justified on a ground-up
basis. IPRs specialists have suggested many reasons why rules

permitting the blocking of parallel imports may serve valuable
social welfare purposes.
The question is one of economic
analysis, of social welfare analysis, of determining whether or not
there is a value to the territoriality of IPRs that overrides the free
trade value.
Trade specialists approach the question with
skepticism: Rules blocking imports are inherently suspect. How
can they be justified? This question will receive serious additional
attention over the next few years.

